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Abstract
How individuals adapt their behavior in cultural evolution remains elusive. Theoretical studies
have shown that the update rules chosen to model individual decision making can dramatically
modify the evolutionary outcome of the population as a whole. This hints at the complexities of
considering the personality of individuals in a population, where each one uses its own rule. Here, we
investigate whether and how heterogeneity in the rules of behavior update alters the evolutionary
outcome. We assume that individuals update behaviors by aspiration-based self-evaluation and
they do so in their own ways. Under weak selection, we analytically reveal a simple property that
holds for any two-strategy multi-player games in well-mixed populations and on regular graphs:
the evolutionary outcome in a population with heterogeneous update rules is the weighted average
of the outcomes in the corresponding homogeneous populations, and the associated weights are the
frequencies of each update rule in the heterogeneous population. Beyond weak selection, we show
that this property holds for public goods games. Our finding implies that heterogeneous aspiration
dynamics is additive. This additivity greatly reduces the complexity induced by the underlying
individual heterogeneity. Our work thus provides an efficient method to calculate evolutionary
outcomes under heterogeneous update rules.
∗ longwang@pku.edu.cn
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I. INTRODUCTION
How cooperative behavior evolves has puzzled researchers for decades. The prisoner’s
dilemma [1], snowdrift game [2], and stag-hunt game [3, 4] received much attention in pre-
vious studies [5–8]. They serve as the classical metaphors to study the evolution of coop-
eration in dyadic interactions. Yet, in real-life situations, individuals are often involved in
strategic interactions in larger groups, which can be captured by multi-player games [9–11].
For example, environmental issues like deforestation, air pollution, and climate change are
all public goods problems whose solutions usually need the collective action of more than
two participants [12–14]. When studying cooperation between multiple players, a classical
paradigm is the public goods game [15, 16]. In this game, each individual can choose either
to donate some amount to the common pool or to do nothing. The total donation is then
multiplied by an enhancement factor and the resulting benefit is equally distributed to all
the individuals, irrespective of what they do. Individuals therein have incentives to reap the
benefit provided by others without donating. This depicts the omnipresent social dilemma
in which the interests of individuals and of the collective are in conflict. Without proper
regulation, this conflict often drives the population into the tragedy of commons [17] .
Evolutionary game theory provides a suitable framework to explore how cooperation
emerges and persists under the above social dilemmas not only in genetic evolution [18, 19]
but also in human cultural evolution [20–22]. One key component of this framework is the
underlying microscopic process (i.e., update rule), which determines how strategies spread
over the population or how individuals adapt their behavior over time. In the context of
biological evolution, this is usually modeled by reproduction, inheritance, and replacement
[23, 24]. Analogously, when studying strategic interactions in cultural evolution, imitation-
based update rules are typically employed [7, 8, 25–27]. These rules assume individuals copy
the strategy of more successful peers by comparing payoffs, which relies on social information.
They create valuable criteria used by decision-makers in circumstances where rationality is
bounded and shortcuts for decision-making are needed. However, imitation-based rules are
far from adequately depicting individuals’ decision process, for instance, when social infor-
mation is unreliable upfront. Another heuristics, which is commonly found in both animal
and human behavioral ecology, is the aspiration-driven decision-making. Aspiration-driven
decision-making assumes that individuals depend on personal rather than social information
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to make decisions: they self-evaluate behaviors by comparing payoffs with their endogenous
aspirations and switch if the performance is not good enough. For example, bumblebees
most often stay and probe another flower of a plant when the previously probed one at the
same plant has a larger volume of nectar than a threshold, otherwise they leave immedi-
ately [28]; honeybee, Apis mellifera, and Norway rat, Rattus norvegicus, are found to follow
a copy-if-dissatisfied foraging strategy [29, 30]. As for humans, the ubiquity of reference
points [31] and satisficing strategies [32–34] clearly implies an underlying aspiration-based
decision-making heuristic.
The prevalence of these two classes of rules elicits intensive studies on how they shape
the evolution of cooperation [5, 23, 35–38]. Although interesting phenomena are revealed, a
tacit assumption in these studies is that all individuals use the same update rule. Indeed,
models with heterogeneous update rules are much harder to analyze than their homoge-
neous counterparts due to the high dimensionality and increasing complexity. Nonetheless,
recent behavioral experiments indicate that humans have consistent individual differences
on how they gather information and process it to make decisions [39, 40]. In addition, the
heterogeneity of decision-making is suggested to be vital for understanding human strategic
behavior [41]. More importantly, incorporating individual variations into the models may
result in different predictions when compared with those obtained under the assumption of
homogeneity [14, 42]. To better understand the pattern resulting from individual strategic
interactions, it is thus necessary to incorporate heterogeneity into update rules and try to
deal with the rising complexity. Heterogeneity in update rules can be modeled by assigning
different individuals different types of update rules [43, 44] or the same type of update rule
but realized by different (update) functions [45–48]. For example, the pioneering work by
Kirchkamp [45] explores the evolution of update rules characterized by functions with three
parameters. The evolutionary dynamics with a mixture of individuals using different types
of imitation-based rules is also investigated [43]. However, most of these results are obtained
by simulations and there is no general property connecting the heterogeneous population
with its homogeneous counterparts. A recent study which explores the mixing of innovative
and imitative dynamics indeed analyzes the possible connections between heterogeneous and
homogeneous populations but they fail to reveal any general property [49].
Here, we propose heterogeneous aspiration dynamics, where each individual adopts
aspiration-based rules with individualized update functions. Our aim is to explore (i)
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whether and how the heterogeneity in update rules alters the evolutionary outcome, and (ii)
the relation between the evolutionary outcome of the heterogeneous population and those of
its homogeneous counterparts. Resorting to tools stemming from statistical physics, we first
derive the deterministic equations for heterogeneous aspiration dynamics in both well-mixed
and structured populations. We find that the solutions to these equations agree very well
with evolutionary outcomes calculated from simulations. Then for both weak and strong
selections, we reveal a simple property of heterogeneous aspiration dynamics in public goods
games: the evolutionary outcome of a heterogeneous population is the weighted average of
the outcomes of the corresponding homogeneous populations, and the associated weights
are the frequencies of each update rule in the heterogeneous population. This implies that
heterogeneous aspiration dynamics is additive. By virtue of this property, one can greatly
reduce the computational complexity involved in the original multi-dimensional birth-death
process, which is in general analytically intractable.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we present our model about heterogeneous
aspiration dynamics. In Sec. III, we briefly explain our methods and derive the set of
equations under any selection intensity in both well-mixed and structured populations. In
Sec. III A, we derive the condition for strategy (abundance) dominance and reveal a simple
property (i.e., additivity) that holds for any two-strategy multiplayer games under weak
selection. We also perform simulations to validate our results on the condition for strategy
dominance. In Sec. III B, we compare numerical solutions with simulations to show that
our equations accurately predict the evolutionary outcomes for a large range of selection
intensities beyond weak selection. Meanwhile, we find that additivity applies to public
goods games under strong selection intensities. In Sec. IV, our findings are summarized and
we offer some discussion.
II. MODEL
In our model, the population size is N . Individuals play d-player games with others. In
the game, they can choose to play either strategy A or strategy B. We specify that an A
(B) player facing k other A coplayers among the rest d− 1 coplayers will receive a payoff ak
(bk). The corresponding payoff matrix is given by the table below.
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FIG. 1. Schematic of the heterogeneous aspiration dynamics. The population structure is depicted
by a network, where nodes are occupied by individuals and links represent social ties. Initially,
each individual is assigned to a strategy (the color of the outer circle) and an update function
(the number in the inner circle). At each time step, a focal individual is randomly selected to
revise its strategy using its own update function. As illustrated, at time t, an individual playing
strategy B (red circle) is chosen to update (marked by the dashed square). It plays games with
its neighbors and collects a payoff piB. With the probability given by its own update function,
g1(β(e− piB)), it switches to another strategy (here, strategy A, blue circle). Note that even if all
neighbors of the focal individual use strategy B, it is still possible for the focal individual to switch
to strategy A since aspiration-based update rules are innovative [35, 49]. According to the definition
of update functions, an individual’s tendency to change its strategy will decrease as its associated
payoff increases. The aspiration level e serves as a benchmark for evaluating the performance of
strategies and individuals’ satisfaction [33]. Moreover, the strictness of this evaluation is controlled
by the selection intensity β. If β →∞, individuals switch deterministically if it is not satisfied. If
β → 0, their payoffs have a small impact on their decision-makings and they will switch strategies
with a nearly constant probability.
TABLE I. Payoff matrix of a d-player game.
Number of A opponents 0 1 2 · · · k · · · d− 1
A a0 a1 a2 · · · ak · · · ad−1
B b0 b1 b2 · · · bk · · · bd−1
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For the strategy updating, there areM (M  N) update functions gi(u) (i = 1, 2, · · · ,M)
in the population. Here, we assume for any individual X, u = β(e − piX) where piX is its
average payoff, e the aspiration level, and β the selection intensity (see Fig. 1 for further
explanation). These aspiration-based update functions gi (u) map the difference between
aspiration and payoff into a probability, with which individuals switch to another strategy
(for two-strategy games, the switching is either from strategy B to A or from A to B).
Different update functions characterize individuals’ personalities on the decision-making
process. For example, individuals using the update function 1/(1+exp(−u)) are more likely
to switch than those using 1/(1 + 10 exp(−u)). For convenience, we will use gi, gi(u) and
gi (β(e− piX)) interchangeably throughout this paper.
In our model, each individual is equipped with one of the M update functions and the
fraction of individuals using gi is denoted as zi. We assume that individuals do not change
their update functions during the evolution. Besides, each update function gi(u) should
satisfy the following constraints:
1. it is a probability, i.e., gi(u) ∈ [0, 1] for any u ∈ (−∞,+∞);
2. it is a monotonically increasing function of u, i.e. g′i(u) > 0 for any u;
3. gi(0) > 0.
The first constraint is self-explanatory. The second one ensures that the update rules are
evolutionary, which means that when individuals get higher payoffs they should have a
decreasing tendency to switch their strategies. In this sense, the strategy that generates a
higher (lower) payoff is more likely to be kept (discarded) in the population. The third one
prevents the frozen dynamics in the neutral case when β = 0.
For the heterogeneous aspiration dynamics, at each generation, a focal individual X is
randomly selected from the population. It collects its payoff piX by engaging in d-player
games. In a well-mixed population, the other d− 1 players are randomly sampled from the
rest of population [50, 51]. In a structured population depicted by a (d− 1)-regular graph,
each individual organizes a game including itself and its d − 1 nearest neighbours. Thus,
individual X participates in a total of d games organized by itself and its d − 1 nearest
neighbors [52, 53]. After the games, the focal individual X compares its payoff piX with
its aspiration e. Based on its own update function giX (iX is the index of X’s update
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function), it chooses to switch to the other strategy with probability giX or keep the same
strategy with the complementary probability. Noteworthy, this implies that heterogeneous
aspiration dynamics allows individuals to switch to strategies absent in their neighborhood,
which indicates that aspiration-based rules are innovative [35, 49].
Generally, the above process can be modeled by a Markov chain with 2N states where
each state specifies which individual uses what strategy. This Markov chain is aperiodic and
irreducible, admitting a unique stationary distribution [54]. In this distribution, we calculate
the average frequencies (i.e., abundances) of strategy A and B. If the average frequency of
strategy A is greater than that of B, we say that strategy A outcompetes B in abundance;
otherwise, strategy B outcompetes A in abundance [54, 55].
III. RESULTS
We consider the simplest case where there are M = 2 update functions present, g1 and
g2. In the population, the fractions of individuals using them are z1 and z2, respectively.
Here, both z1 and z2 are positive constants and they sum up to 1. Accordingly, the number
of individuals using g1 and g2 are N1 = z1N  1 and N2 = z2N  1. As mentioned in
the previous section, individuals do not change their update functions during the evolution,
which means that zi and Ni are fixed parameters (i = 1, 2). Meanwhile, since individuals
keep revising their strategies, the frequency of individuals playing strategy A (i.e., A-players)
changes over time (i.e., xi, yi, and pAi in Table II).
Under these settings, we derive deterministic equations in the large N limit (N →∞) for
both well-mixed populations (see Appendix A) and structured ones represented by regular
graphs (see Appendix B). In a nutshell, in well-mixed populations, following a similar pro-
cedure to that in [56–58], we first obtain the Fokker-Planck equation by a Kramers-Moyal
expansion and then the corresponding stochastic differential equations. After that, by taking
the limit N → ∞, we obtain the set of deterministic equations. In structured populations,
to capture the additional spatial correlation, we use the method of pair approximation [24].
Let us first consider well-mixed populations. We denote the number of A-players using
update function i as ni (0 ≤ ni ≤ Ni, i = 1, 2). Then the associated frequencies of A-players
using update function i are yi = ni/N ∈ [0, zi]. After some calculations (see details in
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TABLE II. Main notations used in the Results Section. The upper part contains fixed parameters
while the lower one the dynamic variables.
Notation Definition
N Population size
d Group size
k Degree of regular graphs, k = d− 1
β Selection intensity
e Aspiration level
gi Update function i
zi The fraction of individuals using gi in the population. 0 < zi < 1
Ni The number of individuals using gi in the population. Ni = ziN  1
ni The number of A-players in the well-mixed population
yi The frequency of A-players in the well-mixed population. yi = ni/N
xi The frequency of A-players among the individuals who use gi in the well-mixed
population. xi = ni/Ni = yi/zi
pAi The frequency of A-players among the individuals who use gi on regular graphs
qA|A The conditional probability of finding an A-player in a focal individual’s
neighborhood, given that the focal individual is an A-player
piA, piB Average payoffs of A,B-players
Appendix A), we reach the following deterministic equations
y˙i = (zi − yi)gi (β(e− piB(y1, y2)))− yigi (β(e− piA(y1, y2))) (1)
where piA(y1, y2) =
∑d−1
k=0
(
d−1
k
)
(y1+y2)
k (1− y1 − y2)d−1−k ak and piB(y1, y2) =
∑d−1
k=0
(
d−1
k
)
(y1+
y2)
k (1− y1 − y2)d−1−k bk. Note that the homogeneous case, where only g2 or g1 is present,
is recovered from Eqs. (1) by setting z1 = 0 (y1 ≡ 0) or z2 = 0 (y2 ≡ 0).
For positive z1 and z2, we can normalize the variables yi to the range [0, 1] by introducing
the new variables xi = yi/zi. Here, xi is the frequency of A-players among the individuals
who use update function gi. Therefore, the equations governing the evolution of xi in well-
mixed populations are
x˙i = (1− xi)gi (β(e− piB(x1, x2)))− xigi (β(e− piA(x1, x2))) (2)
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where
piA(x1, x2) =
d−1∑
k=0
(
d− 1
k
)
(z1x1 + z2x2)
k (1− z1x1 − z2x2)d−1−k ak,
piB(x1, x2) =
d−1∑
k=0
(
d− 1
k
)
(z1x1 + z2x2)
k (1− z1x1 − z2x2)d−1−k bk.
Now we start to derive the equations for structured populations. To do this, we tailor
the pair approximation method for the heterogeneous aspiration dynamics. Following the
convention in [24], some notations are introduced here. The degree of the regular network is
k = d− 1. The frequency of strategy A in the population is pA and that of strategy B is pB.
The probability to find a Y Z pair is denoted as pY Z and the conditional probability for a
Y individual to find a Z neighbor is denoted as qZ|Y (Y, Z = A,B). Within the individuals
using update function gi, the frequency of strategy A is pAi and that of strategy B is pBi .
The relationship between these notations are pA+pB = 1, pAi +pBi = 1, pY = z1pY1 + z2pY2 ,
pY Z = pY · qZ|Y (i = 1, 2 and Y, Z = A,B).
After the calculations, we obtain the equations for heterogeneous aspiration dynamics in
structured populations (see detailed derivation in Appendix B). To simplify notations, we
define QA(k, kA) =
(
k
kA
)
qkAA|Aq
k−kA
B|A as the probability of finding kA A-players among the k
neighbors of a focal individual, given that this focal individual uses strategy A; similarly,
QB(k, kA) =
(
k
kA
)
qkAA|Bq
k−kA
B|B is the probability of finding kA A-players in the neighborhood of
an individual using strategy B. Then, the heterogeneous aspiration dynamics in structured
populations is described by the following equations
p˙A1 =
pB1
N
k∑
kA=0
QB(k, kA) g1 (uB,kA)−
pA1
N
k∑
kA=0
QA(k, kA) g1 (uA,kA) , (3)
p˙A2 =
pB2
N
k∑
kA=0
QB(k, kA) g2 (uB,kA)−
pA2
N
k∑
kA=0
QA(k, kA) g2 (uA,kA) , (4)
q˙A|A =
1
pA
k∑
kA=0
QB(k, kA)
(
2kA
Nk
)
[z1pB1 g1 (uB,kA) + z2pB2 g2 (uB,kA)]
− 1
pA
k∑
kA=0
QA(k, kA)
(
2kA
Nk
)
[z1pA1g1 (uA,kA) + z2pA2g2 (uA,kA)]
− qA|A
pA
(z1p˙A1 + z2p˙A2), (5)
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where uA,kA = β(e− piA,kA), uB,kA = β(e− piB,kA), and
piA,kA =
1
k + 1
[
akA + kA
k−1∑
lA=0
QA(k − 1, lA)alA+1 + (k − kA)
k−1∑
lA=0
QB(k − 1, lA)alA
]
,
piB,kA =
1
k + 1
[
bkA + kA
k−1∑
lA=0
QA(k − 1, lA)blA+1 + (k − kA)
k−1∑
lA=0
QB(k − 1, lA)blA
]
,
(see [59]). For a better understanding, we explain the terms in piA,kA one by one: akA is
the payoff derived from the game organized by the focal A-player itself; kA
∑k−1
lA=0
QA(k −
1, lA)alA+1 is the total payoff gained by participating in the games organized by the kA A-
neighbors; (k − kA)
∑k−1
lA=0
QB(k − 1, lA)alA is the total payoff obtained by engaging in the
games organized by the rest k − kA B-neighbors. Since qB|A = 1 − qA|A, qA|B = (z1pA1 +
z2pA2)(1−qA|A)/(1−z1pA1−z2pA2), and qB|B = 1−qA|B, Eqs. (3-5) depict a closed dynamic
system with three state variables pA1 , pA2 , and qA|A.
As shown above, for M = 2 update functions, we need two variables (x1 and x2) to
describe the dynamics of the system in well-mixed populations. They are the frequencies of
A-players among the individuals using update function g1 or g2. On regular graphs, the same
two variables are pA1 and pA2 . Meanwhile, to capture the spatial correlation resulting from
the population structure, we need an additional variable qA|A, which depicts the assortment
of strategy A. In general, for M > 2 update functions with Ni  1 for all i (i = 1, 2, · · · ,M),
M independent variables are needed in well-mixed populations and M + 1 ones on regular
graphs. To obtain the corresponding set of deterministic equations, it is straightforward to
generalize our approach in Appendix A and Appendix B.
With the dynamical equations in well-mixed and structured populations, we now turn to
analyze their long-term behavior. We focus on the average abundance of strategy A in the
whole population in the steady state (i.e., in equilibrium). Let us denote this quantity of
interest as x∗ and the fixed points of Eqs. (2) as (x∗1, x
∗
2). By definition, we have x
∗ = z1x∗1 +
z2x
∗
2 in well-mixed populations. Similarly, in structured populations, x
∗ = z1p∗A1 + z2p
∗
A2
,
where p∗A1 and p
∗
A2
are the first two coordinates of the fixed points for Eqs. (3-5).
In what follows, we will focus on the effect selection intensity, β, has on the long-term
dynamics. In the limit of weak selection (i.e., β → 0), the payoff and aspiration level have
a small impact on individuals’ decisions and they will switch to the other strategy with
a probability close to g(0); in the strong selection limit, β → ∞, the difference between
aspiration and payoff plays a decisive role in individuals’ strategy updating: they will deter-
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ministically stick to their strategy when their aspiration is met and switch otherwise. For
an intermediate β, strategies generating high payoffs will be more likely to be repeated.
A. Weak selection
Under the weak selection limit β → 0, in both well-mixed and structured populations,
the average abundance of strategy A in the steady state is
x∗ =
1
2
+
1
2d+1
(
z1
g′1(0)
g1(0)
+ z2
g′2(0)
g2(0)
) d−1∑
k=0
(
d− 1
k
)
(ak − bk)β +O(β2) (6)
and that of B is 1− x∗ (see Appendix A and Appendix B for detailed calculations). Rear-
ranging the items in the above equation, we have
x∗ ≈ z1
(
1
2
+
1
2d+1
g′1(0)
g1(0)
d−1∑
k=0
(
d− 1
k
)
(ak − bk)β +O(β2)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
x∗I
+z2
(
1
2
+
1
2d+1
g′2(0)
g2(0)
d−1∑
k=0
(
d− 1
k
)
(ak − bk)β +O(β2)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
x∗II
. (7)
As shown in [37], x∗I (x
∗
II) is exactly the average abundance of strategy A in the steady state
of the homogeneous population where all the individuals employ the same update function
g1 (g2). Since z1, z2 > 0 and z1 + z2 = 1, Eq. (7) indicates that under the limit of weak
selection, x∗ ≈ z1x∗I + z2x∗II. This means that the average abundance of strategy A in the
heterogeneous population is just the weighted average of those in the homogeneous ones. In
other words, aspiration dynamics with heterogenous update functions is additive, provided
the selection intensity β is sufficiently weak.
Moreover, since g′i(0) > 0 and gi(0) > 0 (i = 1, 2) in Eq. (6), we can derive the condition
for strategy A to outcompete strategy B in abundance in the steady state (i.e., x∗ > 1/2
[55, 60]). This condition for strategy dominance is
d−1∑
k=0
(
d− 1
k
)
(ak − bk) > 0. (8)
Note that the above condition is also found in a finite well-mixed population with a ho-
mogenous update function [37]. Although condition (8) is derived in infinite populations,
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our results will approximately hold for finite (but large) populations. This is justified for
two reasons: the binomial approximation remains good for large N ; the stochasticity intro-
duced by finite population size does not affect the average abundance of strategy A since
the fluctuation is Gaussian with a zero mean in the neighborhood of the steady state [61].
Interestingly, condition (8) indicates that under the weak selection limit, the heterogeneity
of aspiration-based update functions does not affect the criterion to tell whether strategy A
is more abundant than strategy B. Our finding thus extends the applicability of condition
(8) revealed in [37, 38] to the following scenarios: (i) mixed update functions in well-mixed
populations, (ii) multi-player games on regular graphs, and (iii) mixed update functions and
multi-player games on regular graphs. This contrasts with the results for imitation-driven
dynamics where the condition for strategy dominance derived under a mixture of birth-death
and death-birth rules is not the same as its homogeneous counterparts, and it is sensitive to
the frequency of each update rule in the population [62].
To verify our analytical results, we implement agent-based simulations. Here, we test
the condition in three-players games with payoff entries a1 = 2, a2 = 1, b0 = 4, b1 = 1,
and b2 = 1, leaving a0 as a tunable parameter. For these games, applying condition (8)
immediately leads to the conclusion: if a0 > 2, the average abundance of strategy A, x
∗,
is greater than one-half. In Fig. 2, we plot the average abundance of strategy A obtained
from simulations as a function of the payoff entry a0. Our results demonstrate that in both
well-mixed and structured populations, for a0 > 2, x
∗ > 1/2. Moreover, this is true for
different combinations of update functions, as shown in the upper and lower rows in Fig. 2.
Furthermore, the average abundance of strategy A predicted by Eq. (6) matches perfectly
with the simulation results. Our analytical results thus provide a simple and fast method
to calculate the final evolutionary outcomes, which greatly reduces the computational cost
involved in simulations.
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FIG. 2. The condition for strategy A to outcompete B in abundance in three-player games for
three fractions of update function g1: z1 = 0.2 (blue), z1 = 0.5 (red), and z1 = 0.8 (yellow). We
plot the average abundance of strategy A as a function of the payoff entry a0. The other payoff
entries are a1 = 2, a2 = 1, b0 = 4, b1 = 1, and b2 = 1. The left panels are results in a well-mixed
population and the right panels are the results in a structure population set up on a ring (i.e., 2-
regular graph). For the average abundance of strategy A, analytical results (solid lines) predicted
by Eq. (6) match the simulations (symbols). We test two kinds of mixture of update functions: the
upper row for Fermi function g1(u) = 1/(1 + exp(−u)) and its variant g2(u) = 1/(1 + 10 exp(−u));
the lower row for g1(u) = 1/(1 + exp(−u)) and the rescaled error function g2(u) = (1 + erf(u))/2
where erf(u) = (2/
√
pi)
∫ u
0 exp(−t2)dt is the error function [48]. The simulation results are obtained
by averaging the mean abundance of strategy A in 100 runs; in each run, this mean value is the
average of the abundance of strategy A in the last 3 × 107 time steps after a transient time of
1× 107 time steps. Initially, we set the frequency of strategy A to be 0.6. The selection intensity
β = 0.01. Other parameters: N = 500, d = 3, and e = 2.5.
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B. Strong selection
In the previous section, we offer closed-form results on the final evolutionary outcomes
as β → 0. These analytical results are shown to agree with simulation results very well for
sufficiently small β (β = 0.01, in Fig. 2). Now we move further and extend our analysis
to strong selection scenarios. Under strong selection intensities, there are in general no
closed-form solutions. The reason is that we can no longer perform perturbation analysis at
the neutral drift (β = 0). Only recently the evolutionary dynamics under strong selections
was addressed analytically for special cases such as well-mixed populations [26, 48] and
rings [63–65]. Ideally, the set of equations we derived for well-mixed (see Eqs. (2)) and
structured (see Eqs. (3-5)) populations apply to any selection intensity. However, as selection
intensity gets strong, the payoffs will greatly affect the switching behavior of individuals.
It is expected that the dynamical equations obtained from the pair approximation may
generate predictions that largely deviate from the real ones [35, 66]. The reason partly lies
in the inaccurate estimation of payoffs by considering only pair correlations, especially for
multi-player games.
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FIG. 3. Mean fraction of cooperators in the five-player public goods game. The left panels are the
results in a well-mixed population while the right panels are the results in a structured population
set up on a square lattice. The symbols represent the simulation results and the solid lines the fixed
points found by solving Eqs. (2) for the well-mixed population and Eqs. (3-5) for the structured
one. The payoff entries of the public goods game are ak = rc(k + 1)/d − c and bk = rck/d
(k = 0, 1, · · · , d− 1) where r is the enhancement factor (1 < r < d) and c the cost of cooperation.
In the upper row, different colors represents the results with r = 1.5 under different z1: z1 = 0.2
(blue), z1 = 0.5 (red), and z1 = 0.8 (yellow). In the lower row, the results are obtained under
z1 = 0.5 with different r: r = 1.5 (red), r = 2.5 (yellow), r = 3.5 (purple), and r = 4.5 (green). We
show that the numerical solutions are in agreement with the simulations for almost all the selection
intensities considered here. The simulation results are obtained by averaging the mean fraction of
cooperators in 50 runs; in each run, this mean value is the average of the fraction of cooperators
in the last 3 × 107 time steps after a relaxation time of 1 × 107 time steps. Update function
g1(u) = 1/ (1 + exp(−u)) and g2(u) = (1 + erf(u)) /2 [48]. The initial fraction of cooperators is set
to be 0.4. Other parameters: N = 576, d = 5, e = 1.0, and c = 1.0.
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To test whether the equations we derive apply to strong selection scenarios and how
good the predictions are, we employ the public goods games and show the average fraction of
strategies for a large range of selection intensities, from weak (β = 0.01) to strong (β = 9). In
the context of public goods games, strategy A is interpreted as cooperation and B defection.
The payoff entries in Table I become ak = rc(k+1)/d−c and bk = rck/d (k = 0, 1, · · · , d−1),
where r is the enhancement factor (1 < r < d) and c the cost of cooperation. In detail,
we implement agent-based simulations and numerically calculate the fixed points of the set
of Eqs. (2) and (3-5). The stationary fraction of cooperators as a function of the selection
intensity β under different z1 is plotted in the upper row of Fig. 3. Moreover, we fix z1 = 0.5
and tune the enhancement factor r, which depicts the severity of the social dilemma, to
see how our results change accordingly in the lower row of Fig. 3. The results in Fig. 3
show that the numerical solutions (solid lines) accurately predict the stationary fraction of
cooperators for all the selection intensities considered here in well-mixed populations and
for β < 3 in structured ones. In structured populations, when the selection intensity β > 3,
numerical solutions start to deviate from simulations. As mentioned above, this is because
strategy revisions are now largely affected by payoffs. For public goods games on regular
graphs, individuals’ payoffs are affected not only by their nearest neighbors but also by
their second-nearest neighbors. The effect of the latter (i.e, triplet correlations) is neglected
in the pair approximation, which leads to deviations. Albeit this, the numerical solutions
in structured populations match the simulations reasonably well for strong selections: the
values are close to the ones obtained from simulations up to selection intensity β = 9. This
suggests that for heterogenous aspiration dynamics, pair approximation can be an efficient
method to calculate the evolutionary outcomes under strong selection intensities.
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FIG. 4. The additivity of aspiration dynamics with mixed (heterogeneous) update functions in
public goods games. The stationary fraction of cooperators in the mixed population (with g1
and g2) is denoted as x
∗
mixed and that in the homogeneous ones is represented by x
∗
I (only with
g1) or x
∗
II (only with g2). How well the results of the mixed system can be approximated by
the weighted average of those in the homogeneous systems is measured by the difference DMH =
x∗mixed − z1x∗I − z2x∗II, where zi is the fraction of individuals using gi in the mixed population. We
plot this difference as a function of the selection intensity β. Symbols represent results obtained
from simulations while solid lines from numerical solutions. The upper row shows the results by
fixing r = 1.5 and varying z1 while the lower row by fixing z = 0.5 and varying r. The other
notations and parameters are the same as those in Fig. 3.
In Sec. III A, under the limit of weak selection, we analytically derive the additivity
of heterogeneous aspiration dynamics (see Eq. (7)). To assess how robust this property
is to selection intensities, we calculate the difference between the average abundance of
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strategy A in the population with mixed update functions and the weighted average of
that in the homogeneous populations for various β. Here, we denote this difference as
DMH = x∗mixed − z1x∗I − z2x∗II. If DMH = 0, the evolutionary outcome of the aspiration
dynamics with mixed update functions can be perfectly estimated by the weighted average
of those in the homogeneous populations. If DMH 6= 0, there are deviations in this estimation
and the error is |DMH|. Necessarily, if DMH < 0, the weighted average z1x∗I +z2x∗II overshoots
the actual value x∗mixed of the mixed system; similarly, DMH > 0 indicates x∗mixed is instead
underestimated. In Fig. 4, we plot DMH calculated from simulations (symbols) and numerical
solutions (solid lines) as a function of the selection intensity β. The results shown in the
upper row of Fig. 4 reveal that in both well-mixed and structured populations, |DMH| reaches
its peak when z1 = 0.5 and β is between 4 and 5. It means that the discrepancy between
x∗mixed and z1x
∗
I + z2x
∗
II increases when z1 and z2 become closer to each other. This may be
caused by the increasing heterogeneity of the population when z1 gets closer to z2. In the
lower row, to investigate how the enhancement factor r of the public goods game affects the
evolutionary outcomes, we set z1 = 0.5 and tune the value of r. The results indicate that the
peak of |DMH| increases with r. In the public goods game, for the parameters tested, we get
that the maximum error of the approximation by the weighted average z1x
∗
I + z2x
∗
II is less
than 2× 10−2. This suggests that the additivity of aspiration dynamics with heterogeneous
update functions still applies to strong selection. Furthermore, the additivity seems to hold
very well when β < 1, where the maximum error is less than 2 × 10−3. To find analytical
explanations for our numerical analysis, we construct higher-order approximations (around
β = 0) for DMH in well-mixed populations (see Appendix C). We obtain that for the public
goods game (see Eq. (C1)),
DMH = 1
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z1z2(d− 1)rc
d
(rc
d
− c
)2
G1G2β
3 +O(β4),
where G1 =
g′1(0)
g1(0)
− g′2(0)
g2(0)
and G2 =
(
g′2(0)
g2(0)
)2
−
(
g′1(0)
g1(0)
)2
+
g′′1 (0)
g1(0)
− g′′2 (0)
g2(0)
. This indicates |DMH|
starts to deviate from zero (i.e., perfectly additive) at β3. It explains the good preservation of
additivity in public goods games for non-vanishing selection intensities. The above equation
also shows that the closeness between update function g1 and g2 affects |DMH|.
Up to now, we only test the additivity property of heterogeneous aspiration dynamics for
a few values of z1 (z1 = 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 in the upper row of Fig. 4). To test this property for
a wider range of z1, we plot DMH as a function of z1 under various strong selection intensities
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in Fig. 5. Our results show that both in well-mixed populations and on regular graphs, the
additivity property is robust to z1 (from z1 = 0.05 to z1 = 0.95).
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FIG. 5. The robustness of additivity to the fraction z1 of individuals using update function g1. We
plot DMH as a function of z1 for various (strong) selection intensities: β = 1 (blue), β = 3 (red),
β = 5 (yellow), β = 7 (purple), and β = 9 (green). The enhancement factor r of the public goods
game is set to be 4.5. Symbols represent results obtained from simulations while solid lines from
numerical solutions. The other notations and parameters are the same as those in Fig. 3.
Our numerical results are obtained based on the assumption of infinite population size.
However, the good agreement between numerical solutions and simulation results suggests
that the additivity may still apply when the population size is finite, since all of our sim-
ulations are conducted in finite populations. If this is proven to be true, the analytical
tractability of the homogeneous aspiration dynamics [37] can be readily utilized to approx-
imate the results under two or more update functions. Note that the multi-dimensional
system induced by heterogeneous update functions is much more difficult to analyze and
the stationary solution, in general, cannot be obtained analytically [56, 61]. In this sense,
the additive property of heterogeneous aspiration dynamics as shown in Fig. 4 may greatly
reduce the complexity induced by increasing dimensions, which saves a lot of computation
time.
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IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigate how heterogeneous aspiration-based update functions affect
the evolutionary outcome. We show that aspiration dynamics with heterogeneous (mixed)
update functions is additive. This additivity means that the final evolutionary outcomes
in a population with mixed update functions is the weighted average of the outcomes in
the corresponding homogeneous populations. Moreover, the associated weights are the fre-
quencies of each update function in the mixed case. Under the limit of weak selection, we
analytically derive this additivity for any two-strategy multi-player games. When the se-
lection gets stronger, simulations and numerical results suggest this property still holds in
public goods games. Utilizing this property, we may circumvent the difficulty encountered in
the analysis of multi-dimensional birth-death process and instead focus on the much simpler
one-dimensional case. Note that for the one-dimensional case with reflecting boundaries, the
detailed balance is fulfilled and this makes it possible to analytically derive the stationary
distribution [61]. Then following the additivity, we obtain the results in the more compli-
cated heterogeneous cases, which greatly reduces the computational complexity. As pointed
out by recent studies [67, 68], a heterogeneous system may be also well approximated by the
corresponding homogeneous system with averaged parameters. Although it looks similar to
our results, it is different from the additivity we revealed since i) the additivity property
connects a heterogeneous system with its different homogeneous counterparts rather than
one homogeneous system with averaged parameters; ii) the parameters such as payoff entries
[67, 68] are suitable for averaging whereas update functions would seem inappropriate for
this operation.
In addition, in the limit of weak selection, we analytically obtain a condition to tell
whether one strategy is more abundant than the other in the steady state. This condition
coincides with that derived under a homogeneous aspiration-based update rule in finite
populations [37]. The meaning of this finding is twofold: it reveals that the heterogeneity of
aspiration-based rules does not affect the condition; it shows the consistency between finite
and infinite populations for evolutionary dynamics induced by aspiration-based rules while
there seems to be an inconsistency for the dynamics with imitation-based ones [10, 69].
Beyond weak selection, we show that our equations accurately predict the final evolu-
tionary outcomes in public goods games, especially in well-mixed populations. In structured
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populations, deviations occur when the selection intensity becomes very strong. Despite of
this, the predictions match reasonably well with simulations. This is unexpected since (i)
pair approximations neglect the triplet correlations, which affects the payoffs of individuals
in multi-player games; (ii) small deviations in payoffs may dramatically change individuals’
strategic behavior under strong selection intensities. The good agreement with simulations
suggests that our work offers an efficient method to calculate the evolutionary outcomes for
strong selections under heterogeneous aspiration dynamics.
Besides, due to the generality of our formalism, the framework we present can be readily
applied to other social dilemmas and other combinations of update functions. It may also
handle the situations where the population consists of individuals using different types of up-
date rules, for instance, imitation-based and aspiration-based ones. Thus, our work provides
a general approach to address the effect of heterogeneity in update rules on evolutionary
outcomes.
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Appendix A: Well-mixed population
In well-mixed populations, we denote the number of A-players using update function i as
ni (0 ≤ ni ≤ Ni, i = 1, 2). At each time step, an individual is randomly selected from the
population and it switches its strategy with a probability given by its own update function.
The resulting evolutionary dynamics can be described exactly by a two-dimensional birth-
death process with reflecting states [61]. Under this process, if a B-player using update
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function g1 is selected and it changes to an A-player, the state variable n1 will increase by
1. The transition probability associated with this event is
T+1 (n1, n2) =
N1 − n1
N
g1 (β(e− piB(n1, n2))) ,
where piB(n1, n2) =
(
N−1
d−1
)−1∑d−1
k=0
(
n1+n2
k
)(
N−n1−n2−1
d−1−k
)
bk. Similarly, all the other transition
probabilities are
T−1 (n1, n2) =
n1
N
g1 (β(e− piA(n1, n2))) ,
T+2 (n1, n2) =
N2 − n2
N
g2 (β(e− piB(n1, n2))) ,
T−2 (n1, n2) =
n2
N
g2 (β(e− piA(n1, n2))) ,
and T 01,2(n1, n2) = 1−T+1 (n1, n2)−T−1 (n1, n2)−T+2 (n1, n2)−T−2 (n1, n2), which correspond to
the event of n1 decreases by 1, n2 increases by 1, n2 decreases by 1, and both n1 and n2 do not
change, respectively. Here, piA(n1, n2) =
(
N−1
d−1
)−1∑d−1
k=0
(
n1+n2−1
k
)(
N−n1−n2
d−1−k
)
ak. Determined
by these transition probabilities, this process admits a unique stationary distribution where
the system can be in every possible state with a positive probability [61, 70].
Denoting the probability in state (n1, n2) at time τ as P
τ (n1, n2), we can write the master
equation as
P τ+1(n1, n2)− P τ (n1, n2) = P τ (n1 − 1, n2)T+1 (n1 − 1, n2) + P τ (n1 + 1, n2)T−1 (n1 + 1, n2)
+P τ (n1, n2 − 1)T+2 (n1, n2 − 1) + P τ (n1, n2 + 1)T−2 (n1, n2 + 1)
−P τ (n1, n2)
(
T+1 (n1, n2) + T
−
1 (n1, n2) + T
+
2 (n1, n2) + T
−
2 (n1, n2)
)
.
Now we introduce the notations y1 = n1/N ∈ [0, z1], y2 = n2/N ∈ [0, z2], t = τ/N and
the probability density ρ(y1, y2, t) = N
2Pτ (n1, n2). When N  1, following the similar
procedure to that in [56–58], we obtain the Langevin equations
y˙1 = a1(y1, y2) + b1(y1, y2)ξ1,
y˙2 = a2(y1, y2) + b2(y1, y2)ξ2,
where ai(y1, y2) = T
+
i (y1, y2) − T−i (y1, y2), bi(y1, y2) =
√[
T+i (y1, y2) + T
−
i (y1, y2)
]
/N , and
ξi is uncorrelated Gaussian white noise with unit variance (here, i = 1, 2). Note that in the
above equations, the evolution of y1 (y2) is only affected by noise ξ1 (ξ2), which is different
from those obtained for a homogeneous population with multiple strategies [56, 58].
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As N →∞, the diffusion term bi will vanish with 1/
√
N and we approximate the hyper-
geometric distribution by the binomial distribution. Then we get the set of deterministic
Eqs. (1) in the main text.
Under the limit of weak selection β → 0, based on Eqs. (2), we obtain
x˙i = (1− 2xi)gi(0) + (1− 2xi)g′i(0)eβ + [xipiA − (1− xi)piB] g′i(0)β +O(β2). (A1)
When the system reaches its steady state, xi is approximately 1/2 plus some deviation which
is of the first order of selection intensity. Here, we denote the fraction of A-players among
all the players using update function gi at the steady state as
x∗i =
1
2
+ δiβ +O(β
2), (A2)
thus
piA =
1
2d−1
d−1∑
k=0
(
d− 1
k
)
ak +O(β), piB =
1
2d−1
d−1∑
k=0
(
d− 1
k
)
bk +O(β). (A3)
Let the left-hand side of Eqs. (A1) equal to zero. Inserting Eqs. (A3) and (A2) into the
resulting equations, we get
0 = −2δiβgi(0) + g
′
i(0)β
2d
d−1∑
k=0
(
d− 1
k
)
(ak − bk) +O(β2),
which leads to
δi =
1
2d+1
g′i(0)
gi(0)
d−1∑
k=0
(
d− 1
k
)
(ak − bk).
Then the average abundance of strategy A in the whole population in the steady state is
x∗ = z1x∗1 + z2x
∗
2 =
1
2
+
1
2d+1
(
z1
g′1(0)
g1(0)
+ z2
g′2(0)
g2(0)
) d−1∑
k=0
(
d− 1
k
)
(ak − bk)β +O(β2).
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Appendix B: Structured population
Based on the pair approximation [24], we tailor it for our heterogenous aspiration dy-
namics and obtain
pAi + pBi = 1
pA + pB = 1
pA = z1pA1 + z2pA2
pY Z = pZY
pY Z = qY |Z · pZ = qZ|Y · pY
qA|Y + qB|Y = 1
where i = 1, 2 and Y, Z = A,B (see the explanation of these notations in the main text).
Note that pY Z is the pair pointing from Y to Z. In this sense, pY Y will be counted twice.
From these equations, we can get that all the quantities listed above are functions of pA1 ,
pA2 , and qA|A. This implies that the whole system can be described by pA1 , pA2 , and qA|A.
In structured populations, the average payoff of a focal A-player with kA neighbors playing
strategyA is piA,kA = (k+1)
−1[akA+kA
∑k−1
lA=0
(
k−1
lA
)
qlAA|Aq
k−1−lA
B|A alA+1+kB
∑k−1
lA=0
(
k−1
lA
)
qlAA|Bq
k−1−lA
B|B alA ].
Similarly, for a focal B-player with the same neighbor configuration, its average payoff is
piB,kA = (k + 1)
−1[bkA + kA
∑k−1
lA=0
(
k−1
lA
)
qlAA|Aq
k−1−lA
B|A blA+1 + kB
∑k−1
lA=0
(
k−1
lA
)
qlAA|Bq
k−1−lA
B|B blA ].
Based on the above equations, the probability for A1 individuals to increase (decrease)
by 1/(z1N) is
Pr
(
∆pA1 =
1
z1N
)
= z1pB1
k∑
kA=0
(
k
kA
)
qkAA|Bq
kB
B|Bg1 (β(e− piB,kA)) ,
Pr
(
∆pA1 = −
1
z1N
)
= z1pA1
k∑
kA=0
(
k
kA
)
qkAA|Aq
kB
B|Ag1 (β(e− piA,kA)) .
(B1)
Also, we can write the probability for A2 individuals to increase (decrease) by 1/(z2N) as
Pr
(
∆pA2 =
1
z2N
)
= z2pB2
k∑
kA=0
(
k
kA
)
qkAA|Bq
kB
B|Bg2 (β(e− piB,kA)) ,
Pr
(
∆pA2 = −
1
z2N
)
= z2pA2
k∑
kA=0
(
k
kA
)
qkAA|Aq
kB
B|Ag2 (β(e− piA,kA)) .
(B2)
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Then the expected rate of change for pA1 (pA2) is written as
p˙A1 =
1
z1N
Pr
(
∆pA1 =
1
z1N
)
− 1
z1N
Pr
(
∆pA1 = −
1
z1N
)
, (B3)
p˙A2 =
1
z2N
Pr
(
∆pA2 =
1
z2N
)
− 1
z2N
Pr
(
∆pA2 = −
1
z2N
)
. (B4)
Similarly, for the dynamics of the pairs, we could write
p˙AA =
k∑
kA=0
(
2kA
kN
)
Pr
(
∆pAA =
2kA
kN
)
+
k∑
kA=0
(
−2kA
kN
)
Pr
(
∆pAA = −2kA
kN
)
, (B5)
where
Pr
(
∆pAA =
2kA
kN
)
=
(
k
kA
)
qkAA|Bq
kB
B|B [z1pB1g1 (β(e− piB,kA)) + z2pB2g2 (β(e− piB,kA))] ,
Pr
(
∆pAA = −2kA
kN
)
=
(
k
kA
)
qkAA|Aq
kB
B|A [z1pA1g1 (β(e− piA,kA)) + z2pA2g2 (β(e− piA,kA))] .
(B6)
Based on the relation qA|A =
pAA
pA
and pA = z1pA1 + z2pA2 , we have
q˙A|A =
d
dt
(
pAA
pA
)
=
1
pA
(
p˙AA − qA|A(z1p˙A1 + z2p˙A2)
)
. (B7)
Substituting Eqs. (B1), (B2) and (B6) into (B3-B7), we obtain the closed dynamical
system described by Eqs. (3-5).
In order to analyze the dynamics under the weak selection limit β → 0, we first set
β = 0 and let the left-hand side of the above equations equal to zero. Then for this
unperturbed system, we obtain p∗Ai = p
∗
Bi
= 1
2
(i = 1, 2) and q∗A|A =
1
2
in the steady state.
As the selection intensity β → 0, using perturbation theory [71] we have the approximations
p∗Ai =
1
2
+ iβ+O(β
2) (i = 1, 2) and q∗A|A =
1
2
+O(β). Moreover, as β → 0, when the system
reaches its steady state, Eqs. (3-4) become
0 =
1
N
g1(0)(p
∗
B1
− p∗A1)
+
g′1(0)
N
β
[
e(p∗B1 − p∗A1) + p∗A1
k∑
kA=0
(
k
kA
)
(q∗A|A)
kA(q∗B|A)
kBpi∗A,kA − p∗B1
k∑
kA=0
(
k
kA
)
(q∗A|B)
kA(q∗B|B)
kBpi∗B,kA
]
+O(β2),
0 =
1
N
g2(0)(p
∗
B2
− p∗A2)
+
g′2(0)
N
β
[
e(p∗B2 − p∗A2) + p∗A2
k∑
kA=0
(
k
kA
)
(q∗A|A)
kA(q∗B|A)
kBpi∗A,kA − p∗B2
k∑
kA=0
(
k
kA
)
(q∗A|B)
kA(q∗B|B)
kBpi∗B,kA
]
+O(β2).
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Inserting the approximations for p∗Ai and q
∗
A|A into the above equations and neglecting the
higher-order terms of β, we obtain i =
1
2d+1
g′i(0)
gi(0)
∑d−1
k=0
(
d−1
k
)
(ak− bk). This leads to the same
average abundance of strategy A in the whole population (here, x∗ = z1p∗A1 + z2p
∗
A2
) as that
in the well-mixed population (see Appendix A).
Appendix C: Higher-order approximations for the additivity
In A, we derive the first-order approximation of x∗i and x
∗. It validates the additivity
of heterogeneous aspiration dynamics under the limit of weak selection. Here, to offer an
intuitive explanation on why the additivity applies to strong selections for public goods
games in well-mixed populations, we implement higher-order approximations. Setting the
left-hand side of equations (2) equal to zero and rearranging the items, we have that all the
fixed points satisfy the following implicit equations
x∗i =
1
1 +
gi(β(e−piA(x∗1,x∗2)))
gi(β(e−piB(x∗1,x∗2)))
, i = 1, 2.
Based on perturbation theory [71], we construct finite Taylor series in β at β = 0 (up to the
third-order) for both the left-hand and right-rand side of the above equations. By matching
the coefficients of the same power of β, we can calculate the higher-order approximation for
x∗i . The calculation proceeds as follows:
1. For the left-hand side, x∗i = xi0 + xi1β + xi2β
2 + xi3β
3 +O(β4);
2. For the right-hand side, Fi(x1, x2) =
[
1 + gi(β(e−piA(x1,x2)))
gi(β(e−piB(x1,x2)))
]−1
=
∑2
l=0
∂lFi(x1,x2)
∂βl
∣∣∣
β=0
βl+
O(β3);
3. Insert the approximation of x∗i into that of Fi(x1, x2) and neglect the higher-order
terms of β3;
4. Match the constant term and coefficients of the same power of β from both sides and
calculate xi0, xi1, xi2, and xi3.
Following similar procedures, we can obtain the third-order approximations for x∗I and x
∗
II.
After that, we calculate the deviation of additivity DMH = x∗mixed − z1x∗I − z2x∗II = z1x∗1 +
z2x
∗
2− z1x∗I − z2x∗II = D(0)MH +D(1)MHβ+D(2)MHβ2 +D(3)MHβ3 +O(β4), where D(l)MH is the coefficient
associated with βl.
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As already shown in the main text, D(0)MH = 0, and D(1)MH = 0. For higher-order approxi-
mations, we obtain
D(2)MH = −
1
16
z1z2(d− 1)R1R2G21,
D(3)MH =
1
64
(d− 1)2R1R22
(
G33 −G5
)− 1
16
z1z2(d− 1)G1G2R1R2(2e− S1)
− 1
128
z1z2(d− 1)(d− 2)G21(G3 +G4)R21R3 +
1
32
z1z2(d− 1)G1G2R21S2,
where
R1 =
1
2d−1
d−1∑
k=0
(
d− 1
k
)
(ak − bk), S1 = 1
2d−1
d−1∑
k=0
(
d− 1
k
)
(ak + bk),
R2 =
1
2d−2
d−2∑
k=0
(
d− 2
k
)
(ak+1 − bk+1 − ak + bk), S2 = 1
2d−2
d−2∑
k=0
(
d− 2
k
)
(ak+1 + bk+1 − ak − bk),
R3 =
1
2d−3
d−3∑
k=0
(
d− 3
k
)
(ak+2 − bk+2 − 2ak+1 + 2bk+1 + ak − bk),
G1 =
g′1(0)
g1(0)
− g
′
2(0)
g2(0)
, G2 =
(
g′2(0)
g2(0)
)2
−
(
g′1(0)
g1(0)
)2
+
g′′1(0)
g1(0)
− g
′′
2(0)
g2(0)
,
G3 = z1
g′1(0)
g1(0)
+ z2
g′2(0)
g2(0)
, G4 =
g′1(0)
g1(0)
+
g′2(0)
g2(0)
, G5 = z1
(
g′1(0)
g1(0)
)3
+ z2
(
g′2(0)
g2(0)
)3
.
In particular, for public goods games with payoff entries ak = rc(k+1)/d−c and bk = rck/d
(k = 0, 1, · · · , d−1), R1 = rc/d−c, R2 = 0, R3 = 0, S2 = 2rc/d. The deviation of additivity
DMH is simplified to
DMH = 1
16
z1z2(d− 1)rc
d
(rc
d
− c
)2
G1G2β
3 +O(β4). (C1)
This means that the deviation from perfect additivity only occurs at the third-order approx-
imation of β, which explains why the additivity in public goods games is robust to selection
intensities.
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